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Summary: In this article, we examine with event study methodology how quarterly corporate reports affect share prices. We 
examine two tightly connected questions: (1) are the effects of earnings surprises in the published earnings per share (EPS) 
immediately incorporated into the share prices, and (2) can differences in pricing reactions between the sectors of the general 
stock market and the tech companies, which are more uncertainly valued be shown? According to the results in case of posi-
tive and negative EPS surprises (deviation by more than ±2% from analyst consensus) price reactions are almost complete 
and happen in the same direction as the deviation promptly, which however are not followed by significant abnormal returns 
starting from the second day after the announcement. In the group of positive news, the price reaction stemming from EPS 
surprises proved to be significantly higher in case of tech companies, however there is no significant difference between the 
two groups in case of negative surprises.1
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The equilibrium price on the market of a 
finan cial product can be interpreted as the 
combined opinion of market participants 
on the value of the product, based on all the 
information available to them at the time. Mar-
ket prices change according to the information 
market participants have and according to the 
image they form about this information; every 
piece of news and information that changes 
the perceived value of a given product on the 
market has an effect on supply and demand, 
and, as a result, on the equilibrium price of 
the product.
The effect that information has on prices 
is perhaps the most conspicuous on the stock 
markets. strict disclosure regulations apply 
to listed companies, which means these 
companies are much more transparent than 
others. The literature on the effect of new 
information on share prices is extensive due 
to the good observability of the phenomenon. 
seminal studies by Ball and Brown (1968), 
and Fama, et al. (1969) introduced the 
methodology of event study that is essentially 
the same as that which is in use today 
(MacKinlay, 1997).
The main aim of the early studies men-
tioned was to provide empirical confirma-
tion for the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
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1970). These results – and additional studies 
by many researchers – supported the assump-
tion, and as a result the efficient market the-
ory became an integral and dominant part of 
financial thinking. However, over time, crit-
icism appeared in literature, mostly from ex-
perts of behavioural finance. Numerous stud-
ies that describe the connection between 
investor psychology and asset pricing empir-
ically weaken the validity of the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis Hirshleifer (2001), Bernard and 
Thomas (1989).
In the present article we examine how 
quarterly corporate reports affect share 
prices. We examine two tightly connected 
questions: (1) are the effects of earnings 
surprises in the published earnings per 
share (EPs) immediately incorporated into 
the share prices, and (2) can differences in 
pricing reactions between the various sectors 
be shown? our hypothesis is that (1) new 
information triggers a change in share prices 
in the same direction as the sign of the 
surprise, but the effect is not fully reflected in 
prices immediately, and (2) in the tech sector 
the effects of surprises are more pronounced 
since the valuation of companies in this sector 
is significantly more uncertain.
The article is in four main parts. First we 
provide a theoretical overview, describing 
the factors that influence share prices. This 
includes the brief description of the efficient 
market theory and the main behaviourist 
theories criticising it. This is followed by 
the topic of the event study and the related 
methodology issues. The next part is the 
empirical part of the study. We use the 
components of the s&P 500 and the s&P 
500 Information Technology stock indices 
with the highest market capitalisation, 
examining their corporate reports disclosed 
in 10 quarters. Finally, we provide a 
summary and describe the conclusions of 
our research.
FActorS InFluEncInG ShArE PrIcES
The value of any security equals the present 
value of its future cash flows, and in a 
perfect world this is the equilibrium price as 
well. In the case of stocks, it is the present 
value of future dividends.2 As we have no 
comprehensive information about these future 
cash flows, share prices reflect the expectations 
of investors. However, the fundamentals, 
the revenue-generating ability and thus the 
valuation of a company change as a result of 
market shocks and individual shocks. This 
process is described by the efficient market 
theory.
The efficient market theory  
and the random walk of  share prices
A market in which prices always fully reflect 
available information is called efficient (Fama, 
1970). share prices follow a random walk (or 
rather a random walk with drift since expected 
return can be non-zero), which implies that 
returns are unpredictable from past returns, 
and the best forecast of a return is its historical 
mean. on an efficient market, above-average 
risk-weighted returns are due to chance alone 
and are not sustainable in the long term. This 
also implies that no arbitrage opportunities 
exist, as prices adjust to all new information 
without delay (Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991; 
Malkiel, 2005).
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) pointed out 
that costless information is a necessary condi-
tion for efficiency as it was originally defined. 
otherwise it wouldn’t be in the interest of in-
vestors to obtain costly information, as they 
would receive no compensation in a market 
with no arbitrage opportunities. Nevertheless, 
when information is inexpensive, the market 
price will reveal most of the informed traders’ 
information.3 Whenever we refer to advocates 
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of efficiency later, we refer to this more loosely 
interpreted hypothesis.
We can differentiate between three forms 
– weak, semi-strong and strong – of mar-
ket efficiency. The weak form of the theory 
states that future returns cannot be predicted 
from past data. The semi-strong form assumes 
that prices adjust to all publicly available 
information. Finally, in the strong form, it is 
not only publicly available, but all information 
that is reflected in the market price (Fama, 
1970).
Criticism of  efficient markets  
and the semi-strong form tests  
of  efficient markets models
In addition to the effect of new information, 
share prices are also influenced by other 
factors, by several elements of psychology that 
Akerlof and Shiller (2011) call animal spirit. 
The theoretical framework the most closely 
related to our research questions is the semi-
strong form tests of market efficiency. These 
event studies examine how share prices react 
when new information becomes available. on 
an efficient market, a surprise shock should 
be almost immediately and fully reflected in 
the market price. There is, however, extensive 
literature on cases when this does not happen. 
Possible reasons fall into two categories 
basically; it is either that price response is 
delayed, or that certain risk premiums are 
not included in the pricing model, so we may 
detect abnormal returns with it (Bernard & 
Thomas, 1989).
In addition to the continuation of short-
term returns, Fama and French (1996), and 
Fama (1998) mention another important 
anomaly, the momentum after corporate re-
ports, i.e. the share price trend, which is a se-
ries of price changes in the same direction over 
a longer period and which cannot be explained 
in the three-factor model. In addition, a num-
ber of further studies have identified different 
forms of pricing anomalies, including Patell 
and Wolfson (1984) and in more recent liter-
ature Hou, et al. (2010), Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2011), Leippold and Lohre (2012), Chen, et al. 
(2017), and Maio and Philip (2018).
chan, et al. (1996) mentions two possi-
ble behavioural patterns that may cause post-
earnings-announcement momentum. one is 
that due to the market’s underreaction, pric-
es adjust to new information slower. Anoth-
er possibility is that ‘trend-chasers’ reinforce 
movements in stock prices even in the ab-
sence of fundamental information. Behav-
ioural models are built on both explana-
tions [Barberis, et al. (1998), Daniel, et al. 
(1998).]
several researches mention that the effect of 
various cognitive biases is more significant in 
case of illiquid stocks (chordia, et al., 2009; 
chordia, et al., 2014), and when there is more 
uncertainty regarding the valuation of a com-
pany (Daniel & Titman, 1999; Hirshleifer, 
2001; Kumar, 2009). The research of Zhang 
(2006) and Francis, et al. (2007) substantiates 
that price reaction to surprise news is slower in 
case of growth stocks where there is more un-
certainty about the firm’s value.
The hypotheses examined in the article
considering the theories described in the 
theoretical overview, we believe that stock 
markets are not perfectly efficient. In spite of 
this, we consider the efficient market theory 
the starting point, which, due to the strict 
conditions that are necessary for methodology 
considerations, is not fully realised. These 
considerations are reflected in our hypotheses. 
uA surprise in the earnings of companies 
results in a change in share prices in the same 
direction, but the effect of the new informa-
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tion is detectable on the trading days after the 
announcement as well.
vThe effect of the surprise is more signif-
icant with stocks with more uncertain valua-
tion, for example in the tech sector.
thE mEthodoloGy  
oF thE EvEnt Study
The methodology used for the analysis of the 
research questions is the event study. When 
describing the methodology, we mostly 
rely on studies by MacKinlay (1997), Bin-
der (1998), Kothari and Warner (2007) and 
Corrado (2011), which discuss this analysis 
procedure extensively. Based on this we 
describe the procedure of the event study, 
and the methodology details that are the most 
important for our research. In the description 
of the methodology, we use the notations of 
MacKinlay (1997).
Steps of  the procedure
In finance, the question we examine is the price 
response of certain securities to some economic 
event. More precisely, we want to know if there 
is abnormal return as a result of the given event.
The initial task is to define the event of in-
terest and the related event window, the peri-
od around the event over which prices will be 
examined. This is followed by the selection of 
the sample according to various selection cri-
teria. After that we define how we will meas-
ure abnormal return. This is expressed by the 
following equation:
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where AR
iτ
 is the abnormal return for security 
i for time period τ, R
iτ
 is the actual return, 
and E(R
iτ
|X
τ
 ) is the expected return. X
τ
 is the 
conditioning information for the expected 
return model, and it is determined by the 
available information and the asset pricing 
model used (MacKinlay, 1997; Kothari & 
Warner, 2007; corrado, 2011). 
Modelling expected returns
When calculating expected returns, we 
assume that the returns used for modelling are 
normal and are independently and identically 
distributed through time. According to 
MacKinlay (1997), the majority of event 
studies use two models: the constant mean 
return model and the market model. The 
constant mean return model is often considered 
naive in literature, as it does not differentiate 
between the effects of company-specific and 
market-specific information on share prices 
(cable & Holland, 1999; corrado, 2011). As 
a result, it is difficult to establish whether the 
abnormal returns observed are caused by the 
event examined or by market swings.
The market model provides a more sophis-
ticated solution: like the cAPM-model (cap-
ital Asset Pricing Model; sharpe,1964; Lint-
ner, 1965), it relates the return of any given 
security to the return of the market portfo-
lio, thus reducing the variance of abnormal re-
turn and making the quantification of event 
effects more precise (MacKinlay, 1997; cor-
rado, 2011):
       Rit=αi+βi Rmt+εit 2)
εit ~ N(0,σ
2 )εi
where Rit and Rmt are the period t returns on 
security i and the market portfolio, and αi and 
βi are the parameters to be estimated from the 
regression model. coefficient βi shows the 
sensitivity of security i to the market portfolio, 
αi is the fitting parameter, and εit is the error 
term of the security over period t. We assume 
that the expected value of the error term is zero 
and has a normal distribution with a variance 
of σ 2εi.
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In the modelling logic we use, it is as-
sumed that the regression coefficients are 
constant during the estimation period and in 
the event window (Binder, 1998). The actual 
beta of a given stock may change over time. 
However, examining a short-term horizon, it 
is unlikely that significant changes occur in 
risk profiles.
According to Cable and Holland (1999) 
tests indicate that the market model outper-
forms the cAPM. However, both models are 
less accurate in estimating actual abnormal re-
turns than multifactor models (e.g. Fama and 
French 1996). In a large sample, bias averag-
es out to zero, so the market model is efficient 
for estimating returns (Binder, 1998), and ad-
ditional factors add little explanatory power 
(MacKinlay, 1997). considering all the above, 
we use the market model in the present article 
for calculating normal returns.
Length of the event window  
and the estimation window
The length of the event window and of the 
estimation window is set somewhat arbitrarily, 
we fundamentally rely on the experiences 
of previous studies. The issue we examine is 
considered short-horizon in an event study, 
which means a relatively short event window 
is suitable for testing the hypotheses. The 
analysis is quite reliable when the event 
window is shorter than one year, and there are 
significantly fewer methodological problems 
in the course of the analysis (Kothari & War-
ner, 2007).
In our case, the event window must contain 
the date of the event and at least the following 
trading day so that announcements made at 
the end of the trading day or after the closing 
of the stock exchange are considered too, as in 
such cases the abnormal return is necessarily 
detectable the following day, too. This effect is 
especially significant when the announcement 
contains bad news for investors (deHaan, et 
al., 2015; Doyle & Magilke, 2015). In prac-
tice, the event window is usually an interval of 
a few weeks, symmetrically around the event 
date (MacKinlay, 1997).
The more reduced the size of the event win-
dow, the less likely it is that there are impacts 
of other confounding events pertaining to the 
companies (Rao & sreejith, 2014). In our case, 
economically significant abnormal returns 
linked to corporate reports can only be expect-
ed in a period of a few days around the event. 
We can also see in the article by MacKinlay 
(1997) that a few days after the disclosure of 
the report, abnormal returns fluctuate around 
their expected value, i.e. zero. Thus a window 
of four weeks seems an appropriate choice.
It is important to consider that if the event 
window is too long as compared to the estima-
tion window, it can significantly bias the test 
statistics if estimated abnormal returns are cor-
related. However, when the event window is 5 
days long and the estimation window is 100 
days long, the uncorrected test statistic is ex-
pected to exceed the corrected one by 1.6 per 
cent (Binder, 1998). Because of this, we use a 
period that is longer than MacKinlay’s (1997) 
120 days, for example a two-year (500 trading 
day) period to calculate regression coefficients, 
as suggested by corrado (2011). It is impor-
tant to separate the two windows in time; if we 
used also the return data from the event win-
dow for the regression model, the estimation of 
the parameters would be incorrect as it would 
also include the noise caused by the announce-
ment (Boehmer, et al., 1991; MacKinlay, 1997; 
Binder, 1998; Kothari & Warner, 2007).
In view of the above, the timeline of the 
event study can be formally put as follows. The 
running index of returns is τ, and the stages 
of the study are: τ=0 is the date of the event, 
T0+1 ≤ τ ≤ T1 is the estimation window, and 
T1+1 ≤ τ ≤ T2 is the event window. In this case 
L1=T1–T0 is the length of the estimation win-
dow, and L2=T2–T1 is the length of the event 
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window (see Figure 1). A post-event window 
can also be defined as T2+1 ≤ τ ≤ T3, with a 
length of L3=T3–T2, but it is unnecessary for 
our research questions.
Measuring and testing abnormal returns
As expected return is modelled as the linear 
function of the return of the market portfolio, 
using equations (1) and (2) we can provide a 
more accurate definition of abnormal return as 
used in the present article:
AR
iτ
=R
iτ
–E(R
iτ
|R
mτ
 ) 3)
where T1+1 ≤ τ ≤ T2, thus τ is a period in 
the event window. The length of the peri-
od used for parameter estimation and the 
period around the event are defined, so we 
can start building the regression model. The 
least squares method is used for parame-
ter estimation. We know the expected re-
turn calculated during modelling from (2), 
and substituting this to equation (3) we can 
calculate the abnormal returns around the 
event as follows:
AR
iτ
=R
iτ
–(α^i + β^iRmτ ) 4)
where AR
iτ
 is the abnormal return of security 
i, and R
iτ
 and R
mτ
 are the returns of security 
i and the market portfolio over period τ. β^i 
is the estimated regression coefficient for the 
sensitivity to market return and α^i is the fitting 
parameter.
To be able to draw statistically and econom-
ically relevant conclusions regarding the re-
search questions, abnormal returns must be ag-
gregated. Aggregation can be done across the 
elements of the sample or through time. The 
first part of our first hypothesis says that as a re-
sult of the announcement, share price chang-
es in the same direction as the surprise in the 
EPs. This assumption can be tested if we aggre-
gate the abnormal returns in the sample that oc-
cur when corporate reports are disclosed, based 
on whether the surprise is positive, negative or 
neutral. Based on MacKinlay (1997), Binder 
(1998), Serra (2004), and Kothari and Warner 
(2007), the average abnormal return in period 
τ (AR
τ 
) is the arithmetic mean calculated from 
the data of the elements of the groups:
N AR
iτ 5)AR
τ
=∑ Ni=1
where N is the sample size (the number of 
elements in the group), i.e. the number of 
events observed. If the value of L1 is high, 
the variance is [cf. MacKinlay (1997, p. 21) 
equation (8)]:
1    N 2 6)var(AR
τ 
)= ∑ σN 2 εi  i=1
Figure 1
The Timeline of an evenT sTudy
(Estimation window] (Event window] (Post-event window]
   T0                                           T1                     0                    T2                                           T3
τ
Source: macKinlay, 1997, p. 20
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A relatively long estimation period is necessary 
because equation (6) is true if abnormal re-
turns are independent through time. Accord-
ing to MacKinlay (1997) this is true if the size 
of the sample we use for estimating returns is 
large enough. As σ 2εi is not known, we need to 
use an estimate for this when variance is calcu-
lated. Based on MacKinlay (1997) and Binder 
(1998) the variance of the error term in equa-
tion (2) is a good choice for the calculation, 
and it can be written as follows:
1     T1
7)σ^ 2εi=   ∑  (Riτ– α^i – β^i Rmτ)
2
L1–2 τ=T0+1
After that the null hypothesis, i.e. that the dis-
tribution of AR
τ
 is normal with an expected 
value of zero can be tested, thus
AR
τ 
~ N[0, var(AR
τ 
)] 8)
It is important to note that to test the sta-
tistical significance of the average abnormal 
return we assume that in time period τ the 
ARiτ abnormal returns of specific observations 
are independent and have the same distribu-
tion. 
MacKinlay (1997) and Binder (1998) note 
that cross-sectional data are often correlat-
ed. However, this does not cause a problem 
for the estimation if the event windows of 
the specific observations do not overlap. oth-
erwise we cannot assume that the estimat-
ed abnormal returns of the sample elements 
are independent, and in this case, due to their 
non-zero covariance, the variance estimate is 
downward biased, and test statistic is upward 
biased. According to Binder (1998), this bias 
effect is negligible if the securities are chosen 
from different industries and the market mod-
el is used. Rao and Sreejith (2014) explain that 
when event periods are randomly dispersed, it 
helps avoid bias.
If we want to test both the surprise ef-
fects of corporate reports and market ef-
ficiency, we need to analyse a period long-
er than the interval consisting of the day of 
the announcement, and – in case of reports 
disclosed late in the day or on a non-traid-
ing day – the following traiding day. This is 
described in the second part of the first hy-
pothesis. Based on empirical results refer-
enced earlier, we can assume that due to the 
surprise in the results of the companies, we 
could detect the momentum effect in share 
prices in the short term.
To be able to test this assumption, we need 
to aggregate abnormal returns in the event 
window through time. consider an interval 
between τ1 and τ2 for which T1 < τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T2. 
Let cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of se-
curity i over this interval be 
  τ2
9)CARi (τ1, τ2 )= ∑ ARiτ
 τ=τ1
If we perform the same for the average ab-
normal returns calculated for the sample and 
the specific elements of the groups in the sam-
ple, we get the cumulative average abnormal 
returns for any (τ1, τ2 ) interval of the event 
window.
  τ2
10)¯C¯AR¯¯ (τ1, τ2 )= ∑ AR¯¯τ
 τ=τ1
  τ2
11)var(¯C¯AR¯¯ (τ1, τ2 ))= ∑ var(AR¯¯τ )
 τ=τ1
where AR¯¯
τ
 and var(AR¯¯
τ 
) are known from 
equations (7) and (8) (MacKinlay, 1997; Bin-
der, 1998).
Based on this, we can test the null hypoth-
esis: Does the cumulative average abnormal 
return follow a normal distribution with an 
expected value of zero?
¯C¯AR¯¯ (τ1, τ2 ) ~ N[0, var(¯C¯AR¯¯ (τ1, τ2 ))] 12)
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or, in normalised form:
θ=
¯C¯AR¯¯ (τ1, τ2 ) ~ N(0,1) 13)
√ var(¯C¯AR¯¯ (τ1, τ2 ))
With this, we have provided an overview of 
the main points of the methodology used. We 
will do the same with the second hypothesis, 
but there we also examine whether the results 
from the two samples are significantly differ-
ent and whether their cumulative average ab-
normal returns follow a distribution with the 
same expected value and variance.
ShArE PrIcE rEActIonS to quArtErly 
rEPortS In cASE oF S&P 500 StocKS
In this chapter we present the events examined 
and the factors that determine sample 
selection, then we perform the analytical 
steps described in the previous chapter. The 
majority of the data we used for the analysis 
were downloaded from the Bloomberg system 
in November 2017, with the exception of EPs 
data, which were obtained from the database 
of Zacks Investment Research.4
The events observed
The sample selected for the presented event 
study contains certain components of the 
s&P 500 index. To test the first hypothesis, 
we examined the price movements of 30 
stocks with the largest market capitalisation of 
the index– at the time of writing – triggered 
by the quarterly reports published between 
the first calendar quarter of 2015 and the 
second calendar quarter of 2017. (With the 
exception of Berkshire Hathaway, for which 
only incomplete data was available, so we used 
citigroup in the sample, which had the next 
largest market capitalisation.) We examined 
300 reports over 10 quarters altogether, so 
every stock selected is included in the sample 
as 10 separate events. We decided to use a 21-
day event window for the analysis.
The sample was selected according to sever-
al selection criteria. Large companies are ob-
served, the stocks of which are traded on liq-
uid markets. With this, on the one hand, we 
avoid methodological problems like the ef-
fects of non-synchronous trading. on the oth-
er hand, the conclusions of the analysis are 
more reliable as the anomalies that are more 
frequent and intense in case of companies with 
smaller capitalisation and mostly with lower li-
quidity do not occur here.
our second hypothesis assumes that due to 
the uncertainty of their valuation, tech stocks 
react more intensely to EPs surprises. In order 
to test this, another group of companies needs 
to be analysed, too. For this, we selected the 30 
companies with the largest capitalisation from 
the s&P 500 Information Technology (here-
inafter: s&P 500 IT) index.
There are eight companies that are included 
in both samples. Two stocks had to be excluded 
from the second sample as well, Hewlett Packard 
and Paypal, as not all required data were avail-
able for the observed period in the Bloomberg 
database. They were replaced in the sample by 
the next two companies with the largest capital-
isation. This means the analyses to be described 
in the following were conducted on two samples 
with 300 observations each. In the second sam-
ple the stocks were not randomly selected from 
different industries, this must be taken into con-
sideration when the results are interpreted.
The details of  modelling
Before the hypothesis is tested, the surprise 
effect in the corporate results needs to be 
quantified. After that the parameters of the 
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regression model used for calculating normal 
returns are estimated, and finally abnormal 
returns are calculated and adequately aggre-
gated.
Analysis of EPS data
The surprise effect of a result announced 
can mostly be expressed as the percentage 
difference between the actual EPs (earnings 
per share) value over the given period and the 
analyst consensus before the publication of the 
company’s report. The estimated EPs value 
we use is the average of the analyst estimates 
directly before the announcement. This 
indicator is compared to the actual earnings 
per share value on the date the announcement 
is made. This means the actual data does not 
include the reviews of the corporate results 
published later, as the market is not aware of 
those at the time of the event. In addition, 
one-time and extraordinary items are excluded 
from the actual EPs adjusted data, as the mar-
ket is less sensitive to the filtered unique and 
extraordinary items than to earnings from the 
core operation.
After collecting the data of the sample el-
ements and calculating the EPs-surprise, we 
followed MacKinlay (1997) and assigned 
the observations to one of three groups: re-
ports with good news, bad news and neutral 
news. A deviation of no more than ±2 per-
cent in the EPs as compared to analyst con-
sensus is considered neutral news, a deviation 
more than that is considered good news or bad 
news. From the 300 elements in the sample 
from the s&P 500, 195 observations were as-
signed to the good news group, 28 to the bad 
news group, and 77 to the neutral news group, 
while in case of the s&P 500 IT this was 221, 
18 and 61 elements respectively. The two his-
tograms in Figure 2 show frequency data. 
Good news happens much more frequently, its 
distribution is right skewed. The possible ex-
planation for this is that analyst estimates are 
often too conservative and thus negative sur-
prises are avoided. There are much more ex-
amples of extreme EPs surprise values in the 
sample from the s&P 500 IT index than in 
the sample from the s&P 500 index.
Estimating parameters  
and modelling returns
Actual returns are compared to values calculated 
with the (2) regression equation of the market 
model. In every case the estimation period is 
the interval of 500 trading days preceding the 
event window of the given observation. This is 
necessary, as over time the parameters of the 
model may change in case of individual stocks, 
too. This means that a separate estimation is 
made for each of the 300 observations, not 
just by stocks, which increases the explanatory 
power of the model and makes the calculation 
of abnormal returns more accurate. In the 
model, the market portfolio is the s&P 500 
index for both samples. 
From the share price data retrieved from 
the Bloomberg database we calculated the dai-
ly logarithmic returns for individual stocks 
and for the s&P 500 index for every relevant 
observation period. Based on this, we estimat-
ed the parameters of the regression model. We 
fit 300 linear regressions on the two samples 
each as the α^ and β^  parameters of each stock 
change over time.
In most cases α is not significantly differ-
ent from zero. Due to this fact we do not use 
a constant term for modelling the expected re-
turns of most of the observations, only in the 
equations where they were significant at 5 per-
cent. The β^ coefficients of the specific stocks 
are significant at all conventional significance 
levels.
The R2 indicators, which describe how the 
models fit, vary greatly, and a value around 
50 percent can be considered high among 
the events observed. It is not that surprising 
considering that beta only shows the market 
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Figure 2
The disTribuTion of frequency of The ePs surPrises  
in The observaTions from The s&P 500 and The s&P 500 iT indices  
(grey = neuTral news)
Source: own edited, based on Bloomberg data
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risk of the stock, while various idiosyncrat-
ic shocks may result in a significant devia-
tion of actual returns from values predict-
ed with the model. Gospodinov and Robotti 
(2013) say that typically, predictive regres-
sions of stock returns are characterised by a 
statistically small R2 but possibly economi-
cally relevant.
Calculating and aggregating abnormal 
returns
Now we are at the most interesting part of 
the research, the calculation of abnormal 
returns, which is done according to equation 
(4). To test the hypotheses, the calculated 
data points need to be aggregated according 
to the chapter ‘Measuring and testing 
abnormal returns’. It is best to examine the 
three groups within the sample (good news, 
bad news, neutral news) separately, so we 
calculate the average abnormal returns of the 
groups using equation (5) for every period of 
the event window. There are two ways to test 
whether prices move in the same direction 
as the direction of the surprise. one such 
way is to consider the cumulative abnormal 
return calculated for the whole event window 
¯C¯AR¯¯(–10,10). Assuming, however, that the 
information is immediately reflected in 
the prices or that there is no insider signal, 
¯C¯AR¯¯(0,1) and ¯C¯AR¯¯(0,10) are also reasonable 
choices, where only the average abnormal 
returns on the trading day or days following 
the event are cumulated. To establish whether 
there is a momentum in the share prices after 
the announcement, it is obviously the best to 
shift the window, for example to ¯C¯AR¯¯(2,10).
In Table 1 and Figure 3, the effect of quar-
terly reports on share prices are clearly vis-
ible. Right until the trading day before the 
announcement there are minimal abnormal 
returns in the groups with good news and 
neutral news, and expected values fluctuate 
around zero. However, in the bad news group, 
data show significant cumulative abnormal re-
turns already on the days preceding the publi-
cation of the report, with the peak on the third 
or fourth trading day before the announce-
ment, followed by a correction until the an-
nouncement. As opposed to this, at the time 
of the announcement, the cumulative abnor-
mal return of the two extreme groups show a 
surge in the direction of the surprise. 
It is clear that the effect of the surprise is 
still strong on the trading day following the 
announcement, which is caused by announce-
ments made late in the day or after trading 
hours. In case of the s&P 500 IT index, the 
range of abnormal returns is broader in all 
three news groups compared to the s&P 500 
index. In both samples in the neutral news 
group, in the second phase of the event win-
dow ¯C¯AR¯¯ stabilises in the negative, around –1 
percent, although to a lesser extent than in the 
bad news group and there is correction by the 
end of the event window.
In the group of observations with positive 
news, from the second trading day after the 
announcement, once the new information 
is reflected in the price, there is only a slight 
change in the abnormal return. In the ‘bad’ 
group, however, especially in the s&P 500 in-
dex, it seems that there is a short-term mo-
mentum in the days following the announce-
ment.
similarly to the ¯C¯AR¯¯(–10,10) values, cu-
mulative average abnormal returns can be an-
alysed for any (τ1, τ2 ) interval. In the hypoth-
esis testing, Tables 2 and 3 show these results. 
usually the extent of the abnormal returns in 
the various groups is relatively similar. some-
times there is a significant decline in the neu-
tral news group. considering, however, that 
there are significantly more positive EPs sur-
prises in both samples (see Figure 2), this is, be-
sides chance, probably partly due to the fact 
that the sample is from the economic recovery 
period after the 2008 crisis. 
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Table 1
The average and cumulaTive abnormal reTurns of The Three surPrise caTegories 
around The Time of The evenT for The samPles from The Two sTock indices 
τ
s&P 500 
good news neutral news bad news
ar
%
car
%
ar
%
car
%
ar
%
car
%
–10 0,07 0,07 –0,09 –0,09 –0,03 –0,03
–9 –0,06 0,01 0,03 –0,06 –0,18 –0,21
–8 0,10 0,11 –0,07 –0,14 –0,06 –0,27
–7 0,05 0,16 0,00 –0,14 –0,33 –0,60
–6 0,00 0,16 –0,03 –0,16 –0,10 –0,70
–5 –0,01 0,16 –0,03 –0,19 –0,15 –0,85
–4 –0,08 0,08 0,00 –0,19 –0,16 –1,02
–3 0,06 0,14 0,14 –0,05 0,62 –0,39
–2 0,06 0,19 0,11 0,06 0,10 –0,29
–1 –0,02 0,17 –0,19 –0,13 0,01 –0,28
0 0,41 0,57 –0,43 –0,56 –0,73 –1,01
1 0,70 1,27 –0,23 –0,78 –2,27 –3,28
2 0,08 1,35 0,14 –0,65 –0,43 –3,71
3 –0,05 1,31 0,07 –0,58 –0,09 –3,80
4 –0,04 1,27 –0,04 –0,62 –0,03 –3,83
5 –0,04 1,22 –0,17 –0,79 –0,15 –3,98
6 –0,10 1,13 0,20 –0,59 –0,06 –4,04
7 0,03 1,16 0,04 –0,56 –0,21 –4,26
8 0,00 1,15 0,00 –0,56 0,16 –4,10
9 0,00 1,15 0,10 –0,46 –0,08 –4,18
10 –0,07 1,08 –0,23 –0,69 0,01 –4,17
τ
s&P 500 iT
good news neutral news bad news
ar
%
car
%
ar
%
car
%
ar
%
car
%
–10 0,02 0,02 –0,42 –0,42 –0,55 –0,55
–9 –0,01 0,01 –0,16 –0,57 –0,23 –0,78
–8 0,17 0,18 0,66 0,09 –0,46 –1,24
–7 –0,08 0,10 0,11 0,20 –0,79 –2,03
–6 0,01 0,11 –0,08 0,12 –0,06 –2,08
–5 0,11 0,22 –0,24 –0,11 –0,02 –2,11
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Testing the hypotheses, interpreting  
the results
Figure 3 nicely shows the average abnormal 
returns of the groups observed. our hypotheses 
are partly strengthened and partly weakened 
by this. To be able to establish whether what 
we see are really significant phenomena, the 
hypotheses need to be tested statistically. 
Share price reactions to quarterly reports
In order to establish whether these averages are 
actually significantly different from zero, we 
conducted one-sample student’s t-tests. When 
testing the first hypothesis of the article, the tested 
null hypotheses and the alternative hypotheses 
can, in every case, be written as follows:
H0: θ = 0 H1: θ ≠ 0
where θ, based on equation (13), is the test 
statistic defined as the cumulative average 
abnormal return measured for the interval 
between τ1 and τ2, divided by the corresponding 
standard deviation. The null hypothesis 
assumes that the value calculated this way is 
from standard normal distribution. Based on 
economic intuition we expect that the null 
hypothesis will be accepted in the neutral news 
group and will be rejected in the good news 
and bad news groups.
Tables 2 and 3 show the ¯C¯AR¯¯ values and 
standard deviations of the samples from the 
s&P 500 and the s&P 500 IT indices ( is this 
standard deviation, which equals the square 
root of the variance in equation (12)), and the 
test statistics for various intervals of the good, 
bad and neutral news groups. In the chapter 
‘The methodology of the event study’ it was 
mentioned that the variance of the cumulative 
average abnormal returns for the estimation 
period is estimated according to equation 
(6), using the  error term variances calculated 
with equation (6). As equation (6) includes 
the square of the number of elements in the 
τ
s&P 500 iT
good news neutral news bad news
ar
%
car
%
ar
%
car
%
ar
%
car
%
–4 –0,16 0,06 –0,18 –0,30 –0,01 –2,12
–3 0,13 0,19 0,35 0,05 –0,34 –2,45
–2 0,05 0,25 –0,04 0,01 0,62 –1,83
–1 0,17 0,42 –0,25 –0,24 0,51 –1,32
0 0,37 0,79 –0,25 –0,49 0,86 –0,46
1 1,24 2,03 –0,75 –1,24 –3,91 –4,36
2 –0,01 2,01 –0,08 –1,32 0,21 –4,15
3 0,06 2,07 –0,15 –1,47 0,24 –3,92
4 –0,18 1,90 0,09 –1,38 0,52 –3,40
5 –0,07 1,83 –0,17 –1,54 –0,29 –3,68
6 –0,18 1,65 –0,30 –1,84 –1,08 –4,77
7 0,08 1,74 0,08 –1,77 0,24 –4,53
8 0,14 1,88 0,10 –1,67 0,33 –4,21
9 0,02 1,90 0,05 –1,61 –0,38 –4,59
10 –0,17 1,73 0,67 –0,95 0,72 –3,86
Source: own edited
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Figure 3
 The cumulaTive abnormal reTurns of The Three grouPs around  
The Time of The evenT for The samPles from The Two sTock indices  
(g = good news, n = neuTral news, b = bad news)
Note: on the horizontal axis: no. of days from the day of the announcement/corporate report. 0 is the day of the announcement/corporate 
report..
Source: own edited, based on Bloomberg data
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denominator, the variance is usually higher in 
smaller groups, which increases the probability 
of accepting the null hypothesis.
When describing the methodology, it 
was mentioned that the clustering of the 
event dates leads to a bias in the variance 
estimation, but its effect is negligible if there 
is no total clustering and the distribution of 
the observations over time is mostly random. 
According to the nature of the event, quarterly 
reports are usually published within a period 
of a little more than one month. some values 
do not fit in this pattern, as the fiscal year at 
certain companies differs from the calendar 
year. However, this does not mean at all that 
there is total clustering, as the analysis covers 
2.5 years and the dates of the reports are 
distributed over a relatively wide interval even 
within a quarter.
since we test the hypotheses with two-
tailed tests, t0.975 is the critical value of the t-
distribution calculated at a significance level 
of 5 percent and t0.995 is the same at a signifi-
cance level of 1 percent. obviously there are 
differences between the groups, as the num-
ber of degrees of freedom in the tests is dif-
ferent in every case (N – 1). As the distribu-
tion is symmetric, critical values on the left 
are the critical values on the right multiplied 
by –1, these are not separately indicated in 
the table. At a significance level of 5 percent, 
in the first row of Table 2 for example, the ac-
ceptance range is the closed interval between 
–1.98 and 1.98.
Inspecting the values of the s&P 500, we 
see that as expected, the test statistics in the 
groups of observations with good news and 
bad news are very high in the whole interval 
of the event window (–10,10), and this value 
is low in case of no news reports. This means 
that while the null hypothesis can be rejected 
in the first two groups at all conventional 
significance levels, it is accepted in the latter. 
Quarterly reports have a significant effect on 
share prices, and the direction of the surprise 
unambiguously determines the sign of the 
cumulative average abnormal returns, too. If, 
however, the new information is neutral, the 
¯C¯AR¯¯ does not significantly deviate from the 
expected value.
In case of positive and negative news, the 
¯C¯AR¯¯ is even more significantly different from 
0 in the 11-day (0,10) interval from the day 
the quarterly report is disclosed than in the 
whole event window, while in case of no 
news, it is still not significantly different from 
0. In the 10-day interval (–10,–1) preceding 
the reports we can establish whether insider 
information is leaked, resulting in abnormal 
returns. This can be rejected in all categories. 
In the (0,1) interval we see significant 
abnormal returns with the expected direction 
in case of both good news and bad news. 
The negative ¯C¯AR¯¯(–0.65%) in the no news 
group is also significant, (although its value is 
materially lower than the values experienced 
in the bad news group). Based on the results, 
we don’t see significant ¯C¯AR¯¯ values in any 
of the news groups in the (2,10) interval, 
meaning there is no significant momentum 
after the announcement.
The results are similar in case of the 
s&P 500 IT. Even though the values of the 
cumulative aggregated returns are somewhat 
higher, in this case the ¯C¯AR¯¯ in the negative 
news group is only significant at a confidence 
level of 95 percent. In the positive news group 
the null hypothesis can be unambiguously 
rejected for the (–10,10) interval. However, in 
the bad news group, the cumulative abnormal 
return is only different from 0 at a confidence 
level of 95%. similarly to the s&P 500, in the 
group where there is no news in the quarterly 
reports, the cumulative abnormal returns are 
not significantly different from 0. We find 
basically the same if we examine the abnormal 
returns from the date of the announcement 
for the (0,10) interval. 
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Table 2
The cumulaTive average abnormal reTurns of The samPle from The s&P 500 index,  
The sTandard deviaTion of These reTurns, TesT sTaTisTics, criTical values, p-values for The 
good news, bad news and neuTral news grouPs and for various Time inTervals 
s&P 500 τ1, τ2
car 
%
s 
%
θ t0,975 t0,995 p
Good news
(n = 195)
–10 10 1.08 0.35 3.13 1.97 2.60 0.0020
0 10 0.91 0.25 3.65 1.97 2.60 0.0003
0 1 1.10 0.11 10.34 1.97 2.60 0.0000
2 10 –0.19 0.23 –0.83 1.97 2.60 0.4051
neutral news
(n = 77)
–10 10 –0.69 0.50 –1.39 1.99 2.64 0.1695
0 10 –0.56 0.36 –1.55 1.99 2.64 0.1243
0 1 –0.65 0.15 –4.26 1.99 2.64 0.0001
2 10 0.09 0.33 0.29 1.99 2.64 0.7724
Bad news
(n = 28)
–10 10 –4.17 0.95 –4.40 2.05 2.77 0.0002
0 10 –3.89 0.69 –5.67 2.05 2.77 0.0000
0 1 –3.00 0.29 –10.27 2.05 2.77 0.0000
2 10 –0.89 0.62 –1.43 2.05 2.77 0.1636
Source: own edited
Table 3
The cumulaTive average abnormal reTurns of The samPle from The s&P 500 iT index, The 
sTandard deviaTion of These reTurns, TesT sTaTisTics, criTical values, p-values for The 
good news, bad news and neuTral news grouPs and for various Time inTervals  
s&P 500 iT τ1, τ2 car s θ t0,975 t0,995 p
Good news
(n = 221)
–10 10 1.73 0.42 4.15 1.97 2.60 0.0000
0 10 1.31 0.30 4.36 1.97 2.60 0.0000
0 1 1.61 0.13 12.54 1.97 2.60 0.0000
2 10 –0.30 0.27 –1.09 1.97 2.60 0.2748
neutral news
(n = 61)
–10 10 –0.95 0.68 –1.39 2.00 2.66 0.1701
0 10 –0.71 0.49 –1.44 2.00 2.66 0.1562
0 1 –1.00 0.21 –4.76 2.00 2.66 0.0000
2 10 0.29 0.45 0.66 2.00 2.66 0.5137
Bad news
(n = 18)
–10 10 –3.86 1.41 –2.75 2.11 2.90 0.0137
0 10 –2.54 1.02 –2.50 2.11 2.90 0.0231
0 1 –3.04 0.43 –7.01 2.11 2.90 0.0000
2 10 0.50 0.92 0.54 2.11 2.90 0.5931
Source: own edited
 Focus – subjective aspects of financial matters 
Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1 255
In the good news, neutral news and no 
news groups, there is no significant ¯C¯AR¯¯ in 
the 10-day (–10,–1) interval preceding the 
announcement, either. The (0,1) interval 
shows similar and significant results as the 
s&P 500, in both the good news and the 
bad news groups. The neutral news catego-
ry, however, shows significantly negative ¯C¯AR¯¯ 
values here too (although to a much lesser ex-
tent than the bad news group). The extent 
of the price reaction in this index is some-
what larger in the good news category than 
in the s&P 500 index, and the extent of the 
price reaction to negative news is basical-
ly the same in both indices. The period after 
the quick price reaction to the corporate an-
nouncements does not show significant ab-
normal returns in the (2,10) interval here ei-
ther, there is no trend observed.
summing up the results presented, the 
analysis substantiates that the market of the 
stocks in the selected sample is moderately ef-
ficient. We accept the first statement of the 
first hypothesis: the announcement of corpo-
rate results triggers a significant and immedi-
ate price reaction in the direction of the EPs 
surprise. However, we reject the second state-
ment of the hypothesis, as there is no longer a 
significant cumulative abnormal return in the 
(2,10) interval.
Differences in the effects of the EPS surprise
The second hypothesis of the article states 
that the cumulative average abnormal returns 
caused by the surprise in the tech sector are 
different from the values in the other sample, 
and in the case of tech stocks the difference 
from zero is larger, as the valuation of the 
companies in the sector is probably more 
uncertain. 
Two-sample t-tests can be used to test 
whether the cumulative average abnormal re-
turns in the good and bad news groups of the 
two samples are significantly different. [Based 
on Hunyadi and Vita (2008), chapter 7]. The 
variances of the two samples were statistically 
different, so we apply the two-sample t-test for 
the cumulative abnormal returns measured in 
the (–10,10) interval. In this case we examine 
the following hypothesis pair:
H0: ¯C¯AR¯¯SP (–10,10) = ¯C¯AR¯¯SPIT (–10,10),
H1: ¯C¯AR¯¯SP (–10,10) ≠ ¯C¯AR¯¯SPIT (–10,10),
where the lower indices denote the sample 
from the given stock index, and in this case 
we, again, compare the positive and negative 
EPs-report categories in pairs. In this case 
t-statistics can be calculated with the following 
formula:
t=
¯C¯AR¯¯SP (–10,10) – ¯C¯AR¯¯SPIT (–10,10) 
14)
√ S 2SP / NSP + S 2SPIT / NSPIT 
where NSP and NSPIT are the number of 
elements in the examined category of the 
given index.
Based on Table 4, the t-statistic is –17.32 
in the good news group, 2.45 in the neu-
tral news group and –0.81 in the bad news 
group. The null hypothesis can be rejected at 
all conventional significance levels in case of 
the good news and the neutral news groups, 
which means that the cumulative average ab-
normal returns observed are statistically differ-
ent. However, in the bad news group, the null 
hypothesis is accepted at all conventional sig-
nificance levels, which means the cumulative 
returns observed are statistically the same.
This has mixed implications for the second 
hypothesis, as the price reaction of tech stocks 
is significantly higher in the good news group 
around the time of the quarterly reports, but 
in case of bad news, there is no significant dif-
ference between the two groups. The accura-
cy and strength of the analysis, however, may 
 Focus – subjective aspects of financial matters 
256  Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1
be affected by the fact that there were only 28 
and 18 stocks in the two bad news groups, and 
probably a larger sample is necessary to ex-
plain the observed phenomenon, a sufficient 
number of observed stocks needs to be includ-
ed in every observed group.
SummAry And outlooK
The research questions of the study focused 
on the analysis of the effects of corporate 
quarterly reports. For this, we analysed two 
samples from the s&P 500 and s&P 500 IT 
indices with 300 elements each. Both samples 
consisted of the quarterly reports, 10 each, of 
the 30 largest firms of the respective indices. 
The samples were divided into groups based 
on whether the surprise in the earnings per 
share was good news, bad news or neutral 
news for the market. 
We accept the first statement of the first 
hypothesis we examined: in case of positive 
or negative EPs surprises, there is a quick 
and almost full price reaction significant-
ly different from 0 in the same direction as 
the surprise. However, we reject the second 
statement of the hypothesis, as no effect of 
the surprise can be observed from day two,5 
there is no trend observed after the reports 
are published.
The test of the second hypothesis confirmed 
that the price reactions of tech stocks to EPs 
surprises are significantly higher in the good 
news group, but in case of bad news, there 
is no significant difference between the two 
groups. 
The small sample size in the bad news 
group calls for caution in the interpretation of 
the results of both hypotheses, and it would 
be worth conducting an analysis in the future 
on a larger sample with sufficient number of 
observations in all the groups. The analytical 
techniques described in the article should be 
used for less liquid stocks and smaller markets 
as well. However, in addition to the issue 
of a sufficient number of observations in all 
groups, additional methodological problems 
would occur here. smaller companies are 
probably covered less extensively by analysts, 
which means EPs predictions would be 
incomplete or one-sided, and would reflect 
actual market expectations to a much lesser 
extent.
Table 4
T-sTaTisTics of The difference beTween The cumulaTive average abnormal 
reTurns of The samPles from The s&P 500 and The s&P 500 iT indices  
for The good news, bad news and neuTral news grouPs for The (–10,10)  
inTerval
 t-stat degrees of freedom t0,975 t0,995
Good news –17,32 412,50 –1,97 1,97 
neutral news 2,45 106,48 –1,98 1,98 
Bad news –0,81 26,93 –2,06 2,06 
Source: own edited
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Notes
1 We are grateful to Péter csóka and Miklós Pintér 
for their valuable comments and advice. We also 
thank Edina Berlinger, Anita Lovas, Kata Váradi 
and Ágnes Lublóy, who contributed to our work 
with several comments and recommendations, 
and we thank an anonymous reviewer for their 
useful remarks. Naturally, the authors are solely 
responsible for any errors in the article and also 
for the conclusions and opinions expressed. We 
did not rely on any external funding in the course 
of our research, and we do not have any interests, 
financial or otherwise, that could have affected our 
results and conclusions.
2  For dividend patterns and the pricing of stocks see 
e.g. Havran et al. (2015).
3 one example is the time when quarterly reports are 
disclosed: accurate information becomes available 
to wide audiences, which temporarily increases the 
liquidity of the shares (Váradi et al., 2012).
4 Available from here: Zacks, https://www.zacks.
com/stocks/ (retrieved: 01.10.2018)
5 There are no cumulative abnormal returns 
significantly different from 0 on the (2,10) interval.
References
Akerlof, G. A., shiller, R. J. (2009). Animal 
Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, 
and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton 
university Press
Ball, R., Brown, P. (1968). An Empirical 
Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. Journal 
of Accounting Research, 6(2), pp. 159–178
Barberis, N., shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1998). 
A model of investor sentiment. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 49(3), pp. 307–343
Bernard, V. L., Thomas, J. K. (1989). Post-
Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed Price 
Response or Risk Premium?. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 27., pp. 1–36
Binder, J. J. (1998). The Event study 
Methodology since 1969. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 11(2), pp. 111–137
Boehmer, E., Musumeci, J., Poulsen, A. B. 
(1991). Event-study methodology under conditions 
of event-induced variance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 30(2), pp. 253–272
cable, J., Holland, K. (1999). Modelling 
normal returns in event studies: a model-selection 
approach and pilot study. The European Journal of 
Finance, 5(4), pp. 331–341
chan, L. K. c., Jegadeesh, N., Lakonishok, 
J. (1996). Momentum strategies. The Journal of 
Finance, 51(5), pp. 1681–1713
chan, L. K. c., Karceski, J., Lakonishok, J. 
(2007). Analysts’ conflict of Interest and Biases 
in Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 42(4), pp. 893–914
chen, H-Y., chou, P-H., Hsieh c-H. (2018). 
Persistency of the momentum effect. European 
Financial Management, 24(5), pp. 856–892 
chordia, T., Goyal, A., sadka, G., sadka, 
 Focus – subjective aspects of financial matters 
258  Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1
R. (2009). Liquidity and the Post-Earnings-
Announcement Drift. Financial Analysts Journal, 
65(4), pp. 18–32
chordia, T., subrahmanyam, A., Tong, Q. 
(2014). Have capital market anomalies attenuated 
in the recent era of high liquidity and trading 
activity?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
58(1), pp. 41–58
corrado, c. J. (2011). Event studies: A 
methodology review. Accounting & Finance, 51(1), 
pp. 207–234
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., subrahmanyam, 
A. (1998). Investor Psychology and security Market 
under- and overreactions. The Journal of Finance, 
53(6), pp. 1839–1885
Daniel, K., Titman, s. (1999). Market Efficiency 
in an Irrational World. Financial Analysts Journal, 
55(6), pp. 28–40
Daniel, K. D., Hirshleifer, D., 
subrahmanyam, A. (2001). overconfidence, 
Arbitrage, and Equilibrium Asset Pricing. The 
Journal of Finance, 56(3), pp. 921–965
deHaan, E., shevlin, T., Thornock, J. (2015). 
Market (in)attention and the strategic scheduling 
and timing of earnings announcements. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 60(1), pp. 36–55
Doyle, J. T., Magilke, M. J. (2015). The Strategic 
Timing of Management Forecasts.   
[online] Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1479867 (Retrieved on: 21 April 2016)
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital Markets: 
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. The 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), pp. 383–417
Fama, E. F. (1991). Efficient capital Markets: II. 
The Journal of Finance, 46(5), pp. 1575–1617
Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term 
returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 49(3), pp. 283–306
Fama, E. F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. c., Roll, 
R. (1969). The Adjustment of stock Prices to New 
Information. International Economic Review, 10(1), 
pp. 1–21
Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (1992). The cross-
section of Expected stock Returns. The Journal of 
Finance, 47(2), pp. 427–465
Fama, E. F., French, K. R. (1996). Multifactor 
Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies. The 
Journal of Finance, 51(1), pp. 55–84
Francis, J., Lafond, R., olsson, P., schipper, 
K. (2007). Information uncertainty and Post-
Earnings-Announcement-Drift. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 34(3–4), pp. 403–433
Gospodinov, N., Robotti, c. (2013). Asset 
Pricing Theories, Models, and Tests. In: H. K. Baker, 
G. Filbeck, ed. Portfolio Theory and Management. 
N.p.:oxford university Press, pp. 46–72
Grossman, s. J., stiglitz, J. E. (1980). on the 
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets. 
The American Economic Review, 70(3), pp. 
393–408
Havran, D., Lovas A., & Berezvai Z. (2015). 
Vállalati pénzügy (SPM, SKM): Gondolkodtató és 
gyakorló feladatok gyűjteménye [Corporate Finance 
(SPM, SKM): Collection of thought provoking and 
practicing tasks]. Budapest: Befektetések és Vállalati 
Pénzügyi Tanszék Alapítványa
Hirshleifer, D. (2001). Investor psychology 
and asset pricing. The Journal of Finance, 56(4), pp. 
1533–1597
Hou, K., Peng, L., Xiong, W. (2009). A Tale of 
 Focus – subjective aspects of financial matters 
Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1 259
Two Anomalies: The Implication of Investor Attention 
for Price and Earnings Momentum.   
[online] Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
976394 [Retrieved on: 26 April 2016]
Hunyadi, L., Vita, L. (2008). Statisztika II. 
[Statistics 2]. Budapest: Aula
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, s. (1993). Returns to 
Buying Winners and selling Losers: Implications 
for stock Market Efficiency. The Journal of Finance, 
48(1), pp. 65–91
Kothari, s. P., Warner, J. B. (2007). 
Econometrics of Event studies. In: B. E. Eckbo, ed. 
Handbook of Corporate Finance. Empirical Corporate 
Finance. N.p.: North Holland, pp. 3–36
Kumar, A. (2009). Hard-to-Value stocks, 
Behavioral Biases, and Informed Trading. The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
44(6), pp. 1375–1401
Leippold, M., Lohre, H. (2012). International 
price and earnings momentum. The European 
Journal of Finance, 18(6), pp. 535–573
Lintner, J. (1965). security prices, risk, and 
maximal gains from diversification. The Journal of 
Finance, 20(4), pp. 587–615
Maio, P., Philip, D. (2018). Economic activity 
and momentum profits: further evidence. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 88, pp. 466–482
MacKinlay, A. c. (1997). Event studies in 
Economics and Finance. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35(1), pp. 13–39
Malkiel, B. G. (2005). Reflections on the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis: 30 Years Later. The 
Financial Review, 40(1), pp. 1–9
Patell, J. M., Wolfson, M. A. (1984). The 
Intraday speed of Adjustment of stock Prices to 
Earnings and Dividend Announcements. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 13(2), pp. 223–252
Rao, s. V. D. N., sreejith, u. (2014). Event 
study Methodology: A critical Review. The 
Macrotheme Review, 3(1A), pp. 40–53
serra, A. P. (2004). Event Study Tests: A Brief 
Survey.   
[online] Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1066816 [Retrieved on: 28 April 2016]
sharpe, W. F. (1964). capital Asset Prices: 
A Theory of Market Equilibrium under conditions 
of Risk. The Journal of Finance, 19(3), pp. 425–442
Váradi, K., Gyarmati Á. & Lublóy Á. (2012). 
Virtuális árhatás a Budapesti Értéktőzsdén [Virtual 
price effects on the Budapest stock exchange]. 
Közgazdasági Szemle, 59(5), pp. 508–539
Zhang, X. F. (2006). Information uncertainty 
and stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, 41(1), 
pp. 105–136
